ATMP-CA: Optimising Mixed-Criticality Systems Considering Criticality Arithmetic by Fadlelseed, Sajid et al.
electronics
Article
ATMP-CA: Optimising Mixed-Criticality Systems Considering
Criticality Arithmetic
Sajid Fadlelseed * , Raimund Kirner * and Catherine Menon *


Citation: Fadlelseed, S.; Kirner, R.;
Menon, C. ATMP-CA: Optimising
Mixed-Criticality Systems Considering
Criticality Arithmetic. Electronics 2021,
10, 1352. https://doi.org/
10.3390/electronics10111352
Academic Editor: Khaled Elleithy
Received: 27 April 2021
Accepted: 31 May 2021
Published: 6 June 2021
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affil-
iations.
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
Department of Computer Science, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield AL10 9AB, UK
* Correspondence: s.q.fadlelseed@herts.ac.uk (S.F.); r.kirner@herts.ac.uk (R.K.); c.menon@herts.ac.uk (C.M.)
Abstract: Many safety-critical systems use criticality arithmetic, an informal practice of implementing
a higher-criticality function by combining several lower-criticality redundant components or tasks.
This lowers the cost of development, but existing mixed-criticality schedulers may act incorrectly
as they lack the knowledge that the lower-criticality tasks are operating together to implement a
single higher-criticality function. In this paper, we propose a solution to this problem by presenting a
mixed-criticality mid-term scheduler that considers where criticality arithmetic is used in the system.
As this scheduler, which we term ATMP-CA, is a mid-term scheduler, it changes the configuration of
the system when needed based on the recent history of deadline misses. We present the results from
a series of experiments that show that ATMP-CA’s operation provides a smoother degradation of
service compared with reference schedulers that do not consider the use of criticality arithmetic.
Keywords: real-time systems; safety integrity level; scheduling; mixed-criticality
1. Introduction
Mixed-criticality systems are a special kind of safety-critical systems where not all
provided services have the same criticality. For example, in an aeroplane, the correct
operation of the engines is of higher criticality than the onboard intercom system. With
the seminal work by Vestal in 2007 [1], scheduling of mixed-criticality systems became an
active research field [2–8].
Developing and assuring higher-criticality services requires more effort than develop-
ing services at a lower criticality [9]. Criticality arithmetic, also referred to as SIL arithmetic,
is a common, if informal, method to reduce that effort [10] by combining multiple indepen-
dent redundant lower-criticality services or components to realise a single higher-criticality
service. Should any one of these components fail, the others, being independent, will
continue to provide this service. This means that the overall service can be assured for the
necessary higher criticality without the need to assure any one single component of this
higher criticality.
Criticality arithmetic has a number of benefits, as identified in Section 3.2.1. These
largely include the reduced development and assurance costs as a result of each individual
component being of lesser importance to safety than it might be otherwise. However, there
are also a number of drawbacks, as discussed in Section 3.2.2. In particular, criticality
arithmetic can make it more difficult to adequately determine the impact of individual
component failures.
The use of criticality arithmetic is an informal and qualitative process with no formal
universally accepted definition. In this paper, we examine how the use of criticality
arithmetic in a system can impact mixed-criticality task scheduling for that system.
Specifically, we present a mixed-criticality scheduler that takes into account informa-
tion about where criticality arithmetic has been used in the system. Our example is based
on the ATMP scheduler from Iacovelli et al. [11]. This scheduler provides better handling of
tasks that are replicated for criticality arithmetic compared with a similar reference without
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awareness of criticality arithmetic. This amended ATMP scheduler, ATMP-CA, takes the
utility functions as input for each task, so that the overall system utility can be gracefully
distributed among tasks in case of resource shortages, e.g., caused by faults [12,13].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3 describes criticality
arithmetic in further detail with a link to safety standards. Section 4 describes the system
model that is used for the criticality-arithmetic-aware ATMP-CA, described in Section 5.
An experimental evaluation is provided in Section 6. Section 7 concludes this paper. Finally,
a glossary of the symbols of the system model and a list of acronyms are provided in
Appendices A and B.
2. Related Work
Vestal triggered the research on mixed-criticality scheduling with his seminal paper
on that topic [1]. Fundamental to his discussion was the assumption of resource shortages
caused by underestimations of the real WCET of tasks. Considerable research on mixed-
criticality that followed also focused on that specific cause of a resource shortage. With
ATMP-CA, we are able to consider any source of resource shortage, i.e., we do not limit the
type of faults to overruns of WCET estimates.
Baruah et al. discussed methods to tolerate a minimal number of WCET underestima-
tions, allowing the system to maintain full utility up to a certain number of WCET estimate
overruns [14]. Again, ATMP-CA differs in that it does not restrict the source of the resource
shortage of WCET estimate overruns, and it is capable of taking into account information
about criticality arithmetic.
Jiang et al. highlighted the gap between mixed-criticality theoretical models and
industrial standards [15], the cause of which is that implementing theoretical models
in industry is difficult due to the absence of industrial safety standards considerations
during the development of these models. The authors narrowed this gap by extending the
widely used mixed-criticality model, adaptive mixed criticality (AMC) [16], into a generic
industrial architecture (Z-MC) that considers industrial safety standards. Z-MC provides
runtime safety analysis with sufficient isolation between critical and non-critical services
using a flexible model that can be integrated with different safety standards.
ATMP-CA differs from all the works described above in that it does not restrict the
source of resource shortages in WCET estimate overruns, and it is capable of considering
information about criticality arithmetic.
Kadeed et al. introduced online reconfiguration mechanisms to be used in case of
foreseen core failures, while ensuring sufficient isolation according to safety standards
between critical and non-critical services during the reconfiguration process [17]. The
mechanism assumes continuous monitoring for service degradation is available, and
identifies a foreseen core failure if services degradation exceed the hazardous level. Hence,
services are replicated/copied to other cores rather than moving them since the detection
occurs before the core failure. However, service replication relies on plans provided for the
reconfiguration process. Similar to ATMP-CA, Kadeed et al. allowed for other faults than
the original Vestal model, i.e., core failures. However, they did not include a system utility
optimisation as provided by AMTP-CA, nor did they consider criticality arithmetic.
Iacovelli et al. developed a mid-term mixed-criticality scheduler [11], called ATMP.
As a mid-term scheduler, ATMP performs scheduling decisions not at the granularity of
task arrival/completion, but rather after a period of observation, to adjust the system
load appropriately. ATMP is the closest method to ATMP-CA. Whereas ATMP is agnostic
to information about the use of criticality arithmetic in the system, we used ATMP as
inspiration for the ATMP-CA scheduler, developed in this article. ATMP-CA shares many
characteristics with ATMP, but has a different utility optimisation system to consider
information about criticality arithmetic.
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3. Criticality Arithmetic
Although a formal definition of criticality arithmetic does not exist, in this section, we
describe some practical aspects of its application.
3.1. Safety Integrity Implementations
The safety integrity of components or modules is an important concept across multiple
domains, including the nuclear [9], the automotive [18], and civil aviation [19] fields. The
standards associated with each of these fields identify terminology for denoting the safety
integrity of a component, including safety integrity levels (SILs), in IEC 61508, automotive
safety integrity levels (ASILs) in ISO 26262, and development assurance levels (DALs) in
ARP 4654. In this section, we provide a brief introduction to safety integrity, using the SIL
terminology of IEC 61508 [9] as an example. Further details can be found in [10].
IEC 61508 [9] defines the safety integrity of a component as the probability of that
component satisfactorily performing its specified safety function. It defines four SILs, with a
higher safety integrity level being ascribed to components that are more important to safety.
In this way, the SIL of a component is an indication of the extent to which that component is
important with regard to the safety of the overall system. As an indication, Table 1 provides
the association between the target failure rate of a component (the probability of failure on
demand (PFD) or, for continuous operations, the probability of failure per hour (PFH)) and
the consequent associated SIL of that component, as described in [9].
In more detail, the SIL assigned to a component provides information about the
level of rigour expected when developing that component. Generally, development and
validation of a component to a higher SIL require more rigour than development of
that component to a lower SIL. Specific details of the required development activities at
each SIL are provided in [9], and cover areas including test coverage, coding practices,
and acceptability of documentation. It is important to note that using the development
techniques recommended for a particular SIL does not guarantee the achievement of a
given failure rate. That is, Table 1 should be used only for determining the SIL based on
the required failure rate and not to claim satisfaction of a target failure rate based on the
use of specified development techniques.
Table 1. Resulting safety integrity level (SIL) from different failure probabilities (PFD and PFH).
SIL PFD PFH
4 10−4 to 10−5 10−8 to 10−9
3 10−3 to 10−4 10−7 to 10−8
2 10−2 to 10−3 10−6 to 10−7
1 10−1 to 10−2 10−5 to 10−6
As identified earlier, the concept of assigning integrity requirements is common to
multiple fields. Broadly similar processes to the above are discussed in detail in a number
of standards, including [19] (DALs) and [18] (ASILs).
3.2. Criticality Arithmetic and Safety Integrity
Criticality arithmetic (or SIL arithmetic as termed in [10]) refers to the practice of using
multiple redundant independent implementations of a lower integrity level component
providing a function F, in order to realise F at a higher integrity level than that of any of the
individual components [20]. Criticality arithmetic therefore relies on the use of functional
redundancy, or the duplication of certain critical system components that all provide a
defined function. This means that if any one of these components fails, the remaining
components will be able to provide that function.
Different fields use of this concept with their own specific integrity terminology. In
IEC 61508 [9], SIL arithmetic is used when discussing how hardware systems of different
SILs can be combined and in determining the SIL of the resultant combined system. Where a
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safety function is implemented via multiple channels with a given hardware fault tolerance,
IEC 61508 defines that the overall SIL is calculated by identifying the channel with the
highest SIL and adding a number of integrity levels dependent on the hardware fault
tolerance of the combined channels.
Similarly, ISO 26262 [18] identifies ASIL decomposition as a process permitting a safety
function assigned a nominated ASIL to be decomposed into redundant safety requirements,
satisfied by independent architectural elements. This is most often used to decompose a
safety requirement into a functional requirement and a safety mechanism acting against
the failure of that functionality.
ARP 4754 [19] also uses criticality arithmetic within the civil aviation field. This
standard permits the establishment of functional failure sets with multiple members, where
the development assurance level (DAL) assigned to these members is permitted to be lower
than the DAL assigned to the top-level failure condition.
In all these examples, we note that there is a limit to the extent of the criticality
arithmetic that can be performed, i.e., to the consequent increase in criticality of the top-
level component as a result of leveraging redundancy at lower levels. We further note
that an effective system of redundancy management [21] is required in order to detect
primary component failure and to reconfigure the system to use the redundant component
in place of the primary component. Effective redundancy also requires independence of the
redundant components such that multiple components will not be affected, for example,
by a common mode failure. Systems with built-in redundancy can continue to operate, in
some cases up to several days [22], in the event of partial failure.
3.2.1. Benefits of Criticality Arithmetic
It is generally regarded as less resource-intensive to develop components at lower
integrity levels, as the development and validation processes are correspondingly less
rigorous. This is discussed in more detail in Section 3.1. As a result, employing criti-
cality arithmetic in system development can provide benefits in terms of both reduced
development time and reduced development cost. However, demonstrating sufficient inde-
pendence between these relevant components may still be a non-trivial task [23]. Criticality
arithmetic also allows for the commercial pressures of developing and procuring systems.
In some industries, logistical factors mean that components have to be procured before
their integrity levels can be assured. Should these components be later shown to have
achieved a lower integrity level than that expected, criticality arithmetic may be used to
address the gap. Similarly criticality arithmetic can, in some cases, permit the use of legacy
components (i.e., where the development effort is already completed) at lower integrity
levels [24].
Criticality arithmetic permits the use of less-complex components, where these have
achieved a lower SIL than that needed by the overall system. Components of lower
complexity are easier to develop, as well as typically being easier and cheaper to maintain.
Moreover, their use can reduce the risk of an undetected failure mode.
3.2.2. Drawbacks of Criticality Arithmetic
Although the use of criticality arithmetic may confer benefits as described in
Section 3.2.1, it can also lead to conflicts in determining the impact of system or com-
ponent failures.
Given a system where two or more redundant components are linked via criticality
arithmetic to provide a service, a failure of one of these components eliminates the “protec-
tive” element of redundancy. Consequently, the entire service can no longer be adequately
assured at the higher integrity, being now provided only by a single component of lower
integrity.
This is of particular relevance where the integrity of the multiple redundant indepen-
dent components (i.e., the SIL, DAL, and ASIL) is used as the input to a mixed-criticality
task scheduler. Mixed-criticality scheduling allows for tasks of higher criticality to be given
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preference when resources are scarce. An example of such a scheduler is introduced in
Section 5.
Informally, this means that, where necessary, the tasks most important to safety are
prioritised over tasks of lesser importance to safety. However, if one of the components in
the set providing a function F at higher integrity than that of the individual components
(via criticality arithmetic) was to fail, the other components in this set would have to be
given greater preference by the task scheduler if F is to be maintained at the required
integrity level.
A second issue relevant to scheduling is the case of multiple dependent (but not
redundant) components working together to implement a service. In this situation, a
failure in one of these components may result in a failure of the overall service since an
important part of the sub-goal would be no longer achievable. A mixed-criticality scheduler
may therefore choose to abandon all the related tasks implementing the entire service.
4. System Model
In the following, we describe our system model and assumptions. We assume a
mixed-criticality system, which consists of multiple services that can have different levels
of criticality. A service can be implemented by one task or multiple tasks using criticality
arithmetic. The system provides a number of services:
s = 〈id, l, T〉
id is the service’s name.
l is the service’s criticality level, with l > 0. A higher value of li means a higher
level of criticality. The vector~l is used to represent all possible criticality levels in
a system: ~l = (l1, . . . , lk), with l1 being the minimum and lk being the maximum
possible criticality level.
T is the set of tasks τ ∈ T that implement the service s. If only one task implements the
service (|T| = 1), then no criticality arithmetic is used, and the task in this case has
the same criticality as the service.
If multiple tasks implement the service (|T| > 1), then criticality arithmetic is used:
All the tasks τ ∈ T implement the same service s with redundant execution. The
criticality of each τ ∈ T is less than the criticality of service s it implements.
Each task τ of a task set T is defined as follows:
τ = 〈uf, s, d, c, l, p, u〉
uf is the utility function of task τ. The input parameter of the utility function is the
chosen period, i.e., throughput. The utility function is characterised by the following
properties: uf = 〈pprim, ptol , utol〉. pprim is the primary period, with the relative utility
being 1.0 up to this period. At the tolerance period ptol , the resulting utility is utol ,
with the utility linearly interpolated between pprim and ptol .
s is the service that is implemented by task τ.
d is the relative deadline of task τ. We assume implicit deadlines, e.g., d = pprim. (Note
that this assumption is only chosen for the scheduling test in our implementation,
but it is not a requirement of our optimisation method.)
c is the WCET estimate of task τ. Depending on the underlying short-term scheduling
protocol, the WCET estimate can be different for each criticality level. However, the
mid-term scheduler described in this paper does not require this.
l is the criticality level of task τ with l > 0. A higher value of l indicates a higher
level of criticality. The vector~l is used to represent all possible criticality levels in
a system: ~l = (l1, . . . , lk), with l1 being the minimum and lk being the maximum
possible criticality level.
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p, u represent the task’s chosen period and the resulting utility u, respectively. The period
p can be chosen within the tolerance interval: pprim ≤ p ≤ ptol . The resulting utility
is defined by the task’s utility function: u = uf(p). Section 4.1 We also use an absolute
utility, U, which is calculated as U = u · l.
The aim of the method described in this paper is to find a period pi for each task τi so
that the overall system utility is maximised.
The individual instances of a task at runtime are called jobs. A job j is described by
the following tuple:
j = 〈a, et, τ〉
where a is the arrival time and et is the actual execution time. The entry τ refers to the task
this job is instantiated from.
4.1. TRTCM
The fundamental concept of our scheduler is the tolerance-based real-time computing
model (TRTCM) [13,25]. Instead of using a single performance limit such as a deadline or
throughput limit, in TRTCM, a tolerance range is added, which allows a guided search for
the best overall system utility in case of resource shortages.
In this paper, we focus on optimising the throughput of a system based on TRTCM.
For any period ≤ pprim, the relative utility is 1.0, i.e., the maximum. For any period higher
than pprim, the relative utility of a service degrades. This degradation is approximated by
the utility function of a service, which defines another period ptol up to which the service
is still considered acceptable but with lower utility utol . For any period pprim ≤ p ≤ ptol ,








Figure 1. Utility function: calculating relative utility based on the chosen period.
The utility u of a task is calculated from its period p. The periods of all tasks are
adjusted such that the overall system utility if maximised under the given resource con-
straints. For example, if some of the computing cores fail, then the system will have a
significantly lower utility. However, with the help of the utility functions, the degradation
can be performed in a graceful way.
4.2. Computing Elements
The platform model consists of multiple computing elements we call cores cr ∈ Cores.
For our purpose, istdoes not matter whether these cores are part of a multi-processor CPU
or are on separate CPUs. The central objective is to optimise the system utility over all
cores with potential resource shortages.
We also model a notion of computing capacity Cap(cr) for each core cr ∈ Cores. The
computing capacity is linked to the worst-case execution time (WCET) c(τ) of a task τ,
as the WCET is based on a reference computing capacity we denote as Cap(cr) = 1.0. If
another core cr′ has a computing capacity of Cap(cr) = 2.0, i.e., running twice as fast as
the reference core, then the effective WCET of a task τ running on that cores would be
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c(τ)
2 . As such, we can model, for example, the case of different cores running with different
clock frequencies.




This platform model allows the precise modelling of platforms with homogeneous
cores. In case of non-homogeneous cores, it would be better to use a different WCET of a
task for each core cr ∈ Cores.
5. ATMP with Criticality Arithmetic
The adaptive tolerance-based mixed-criticality protocol (ATMP) [11] is an application
of the TRTCM [13,25] that maximises the system utility on each core by adjusting the peri-
ods of tasks within their tolerance range. The basic implementation of ATMP categorises
system tasks according to their adaptation capability. In other words, the ability of a task
to relax its interarrival rates, and its usefulness to the overall system decides if it will be
allocated or not in the case of a omputing resource shortage. In this case, ATMP sort tasks
according to decreasing criticality. Then, a critilcality-utility-aware allocation for system
tasks is performed on available cores. On each core, if the partitioned tasks on that core is
schedulable, then it is processed by the underlying scheduler. Otherwise, a binary search
heuristics with integer linear programming (ILP) is performed to optimise the task set
periods. The optimisation process maximises the overall system utility through maximising
the utility of individual tasks by exploiting their safety margins. However, if no feasible
solution is found for the whole task set, ATMP drops the tasks with the least criticality in
each step of the binary search according to their adaptation capability.
Our modification of ATMP consists of the criticality-arithmetic-aware allocation of
tasks to computing cores, and an adaptation for the ILP objective function to consider
different contexts of replicated tasks implementing a service based on criticality arithmetic.
5.1. Criticality-Arithmetic-Aware Allocation to Cores
The task allocation to cores in ATMP-CA differs from the original in ATMP by avoiding
more than one of the replicated tasks from a service with criticality arithmetic being
allocated to the same core. The reason for this is simply to ensure fault tolerance for the
replicated tasks, so that each core failure can disrupt at maximum one of the replicated
tasks. In addition, the new core allocation also drops task replicas if there are more task
replicas for one service than there are cores available. By dropping these replicas, we avoid
blocking computing resources on a core for no benefit.
Algorithm 1 shows the implementation of the core allocation in ATMP-CA. The
algorithm has two input parameters: Γ, the list of all tasks, pre-sorted with decreasing
criticality; and CS, the list of all cores available for allocation. The outer while-loop from
lines 2–12 runs as long as there are tasks in Γ. On line 3, the function getTaskWithMaxCrit(Γ)
removes the task with maximum criticality from Γ. On line 4, the list CS with all core
IDs is copied as CS′. This copy is needed in case of replicated tasks to ensure that no
two replicated tasks of the same service occurr on the same core. On line 5, the function
getCoreWithMinLoad(CS’) removes the core with the currently minimum task load assigned
from the core list CS’. Lines 6–8 check whether the task tid already has a replica on the core
cid. If this is the case, then inside the loop, a new core is extracted from CS’ until either a
core is found that has no replica of tid allocated or all cores have been tried without success.
Lines 9–11 register the allocation of the task tid to core cid only if the previous search for the
core without a replica already allocated was successful. If this search was unsuccessful,
then task tid is simply dropped and not allocated to a core. This search can only fail if there
are fewer operational cores available than the number of task replicas with which services
using criticality arithmetic are implemented.
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Algorithm 1: Criticality-arithmetic-aware allocation of tasks to cores.
Input : Γ: task list sorted by criticality;
CS: list of computing elements (Cores);
1 begin
2 while Γ 6= ∅ do
3 tid ← getTaskWithMaxCrit(Γ);
4 CS’ = CS;
5 cid ← getCoreWithMinLoad(CS’);
6 while hasReplica(tid, cid) ∧ CS’ 6= ∅ do
7 cid ← getCoreWithMinLoad(CS’);
8 end





When Algorithm 1 terminates, each of the tasks in the task set has been either allocated
to a core or has been dropped. The purpose of this allocation is to assign the tasks to a core.
Later, within each core, as part of the utility optimisation, which is the same as in ATMP [11],
some tasks might be removed again from a core in order to pass the schedulability test.
5.2. Formulation of ILP Problem for ATMP-CA
In this section, we describe the ILP formulation to find the optimal task periods. We
describe the constants and variables of that ILP problem, the goal function to optimise the
system utility, and the different constraints that have to be considered.
Optimisation parameters (constants): In ATMP, the units of scheduling are tasks. As
described in Section 4, each task τ of a task set T consists of the following components:
τ = 〈uf, s, d, c, l, p, u〉
where the utility function uf is characterised by the following properties: uf =
〈pprim, ptol , utol〉. We model the utility function and the criticality of each task τi
in the ILP problem with the following constants:
ci the WCET of τi,
pprim,i the primary period (with utility uprim,i = 1.0),
ptol,i the tolerance period,
utol,i the utility at the tolerance period ptol,i,
WTi the criticality weight of τi,
Cap(cr) the computing capacity of cr ∈ Cores.
The parameters pprim,i, ptol,i, and utol,i characterise a task’s utility function by two
linear lines, as shown in Figure 1. The horizontal line is a constant utility of 1.0,
which can be directly expressed as an ILP constraint. The sloped line of each task’s
utility function can be also derived from pprim,i, ptol,i, and utol,i, for which we have to
calculate its slope ki and y-intercept qi to express it as a line equation:
line equation . . . ui = pi · ki + qi (1)




y-intercept . . . qi =
ptol,i − utol,i · pprim,i
ptol,i − pprim,i
(3)
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Optimisation variables: We use the following optimisation variables to find the optimised
task configurations:
pi the chosen period of task τi,
ui the relative utility of task τi.
Objective function The optimisation ILP goal function maximises the system utility




WTi · ui (4)
The criticality weight WTi is explained below under the optimisation constraints.
Optimisation constraints We express the piecewise affine approximations
ui =
{
1 if pprim,i ≥ pi
pi · ki + qi if pprim,i < pi ≤ ptol,i
of the utility functions to the following constraints:
ui ≤ 1 (5)
ui ≤ pi · ki + qi (6)
The resource constraints are used to limit the workload of each of the available cores








The tolerance constraints determine the maximal acceptable period of pi
pi ≤ ptol,i (8)
In ATMP, the weight WTi is always set to the criticality τi.l of a task τi. In contrast,
in ATMP-CA, the calculation of the weight WTi of a task τi.l depends on the context
with the replicas on other cores. In ATMP-CA, the WTi is only set to the criticality τi.l
of the task τi in the case where another replica of the task has already been allocated
with its maximum utility or there is another replica of the task allocated in the cores
still to be processed. Otherwise, the weight WTi is set to the criticality τi.s.l of the
service τi.s it implements, which is higher than τi.l.
The implementation of the ILP formulation in ATMP-CA to calculate the weight
WTi is shown in Algorithm 2. The algorithm has a single input, the task τ, for
which we want to calculate the weight WTi, as used in Equation (4). On line 2,
function CoresHaveReplicaWithMaxUtil(τ) determines whether a replica of task τ
has been optimised with maximum utility in already-processed cores, and function
CoresHaveReplica(τ) checks whether the not-yet processed cores included an alloca-
tion of a replica of task τ. If one of these two functions returns True, then we choose
the task’s criticality τ.l on line 3. Otherwise, we choose on line 4 the criticality τ.s.l of
the task’s service τ.s. On line 7, the weight WT for the ILP objective function is set to
the determined criticality l.
6. Experiments
In the following, we describe the setup and results of our experiments.
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Algorithm 2: Calc-CA-aware ILP-weight.
Input : τ: task for which to calculate the ILP weight WT;
1 begin
2 if CoresHaveReplicaWithMaxUtil(τ) ∨ CoresHaveReplica(τ) then
3 l = τ.l
4 else
5 l = τ.s.l
6 end
7 WT = l
8 end
6.1. Setup of Experiments
We implemented an ATMP-CA scheduling simulator as described in Section 5. We
configured the simulator to simulate a multi-core system with 10 cores, where we simulated
fault scenarios by making 10, 4, or 2 cores out of the 10 cores available. As such, we
simulated the resulting overall system utility for different cases of resource shortages. In
addition to the ATMP-CA protocol, this simulator implemented the ATMP and SAMP
protocols for reference, as described in [11]. In essence, ATMP is similar to ATMP-CA
in the sense that it also performs utility optimisation, but its core allocation and ILP
constraints for utility maximisation do not take into account any of the services using
criticality arithmetic. So, the comparison of ATMP-CA and ATMP shows the potential
benefit of supporting any knowledge about criticality arithmetic in the scheduler. The
other scheduler, SAMP, is generally less capable than ATMP and is only included for
further reference. We then implemented another protocol, SAMP-CA, which is basically
the simple SAMP protocol, but using the new Algorithm 1 for core allocation, which is also
uses knowledge about criticality arithmetic. As such, SAMP-CA might perform better for
systems with criticality arithmetic than SAMP, but it is not supposed to be able to compete
with the utility optimisation performed by ATMP-CA.
We generated a task set with random parameters for worst-case execution time c
and utility function uf . The implicit deadlines d were chosen to be equal to the primary
period pprim. The criticality of a task or service was either HI or LO, which correspond to a
numeric value of either 2.0 or 1.0, respectively. We constrained the task generation such
that it included two normal HI services (S1 and S2), two HI services that use criticality
arithmetic (S3 and S4), and a few other LO services (S5, S6, S7, and S8). The whole structure
of this task set is shown in Table 2. As shown in the table, the tasks T1 and T2, which
implement the HI services S1 and S2, have the same criticality as the service. However,
the HI services S3 and S4, which use criticality arithmetic, are both implemented by two
redundant tasks T3a and T3b, and T4a and T4b, respectively, which all have LO criticality.
Table 2. Set of services/tasks (S3 and S4 use criticality arithmetic).
Service: name S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
criticality HI HI HI HI LO LO LO LO
Task: name T1 T2 T3a, T4a, T5 T6 T7 T8
T3b T4b
critality HI HI LO LO LO LO LO LO
6.2. Results of Experiments
Figure 2 shows the results for our experiments with either 10, 4, or 2 cores out of
10 cores available. The MAX line denotes the maximum possible absolute utility for each
task, which was either 2.0 or 1.0.
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Figure 2. Experiment: absolute utility of individual services (replications: service S3 with tasks T3a
and T3b, and service S4 with tasks T4a and T4b); lines in graphs are visual guides only.
This case represents the optimal allocation, which means that for each task, it was
possible to assign them their primary period pprim, resulting in the maximum relative
utility of 1.0, and no service was dropped.
Here, SAMP allocated the tasks of all HI-criticality services S1, S2, and S4 to cores,
except the two LO-criticality task replicas T4a and T4b that implement service S3, whereas
SAMP-CA allocated all HI-criticality tasks to cores at the cost of dropping all LO-criticality
tasks. Though both SAMP and SAMP-CA showed an equivalent number of allocated and
dropped tasks, they differed in the behaviour of dropping tasks belonging to services with
criticality arithmetic. For ATMP and ATMP-CA, both protocols successfully allocated all
services to cores, with a slight degradation in their absolute utility without dropping any
tasks. The effect of the criticality-arithmetic-aware generation of the ILP objective function
is described in Section 5.2, in this case, for service S3. With ATMP-CA, the first task T3a was
set to full utility, resulting in the degraded utility of T3b, which allowed allocating resources
to other tasks. Since both tasks implemented the same service S3, there was no need to
allocate both of them at maximum utility when the system experienced an overload, as
seen by the classical ATMP. A similar effect was seen with service S4, where ATMP-CA
allowed a degraded utility for task T4a and then allocated full utility to T4b, whereas with
ATMP, both tasks of S4 were degraded.
Figure 2c shows the case with 2 out of 10 cores available. Here, SAMP retained the
tasks of HI-criticality services S1 and S2 and just one LO-criticality task T8, but dropped all
the tasks of other HI-criticality services, including S3 and S4. SAMP-CA performed a bit
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better by retaining the tasks of HI-criticality services S1 and S2 and retaining one task T4b
of HI-criticality service S4, while dropping all other services. This shows that the criticality-
arithmetic-aware core allocation in SAMP-CA provides some benefit, but generally both
SAMP and SAMP-CA have limited performance, as they do not support flexibility within
the tolerance range. ATMP and ATMP-CA showed the significant difference of dropping
HI-criticality services. ATMP retained two HI-criticality services and four LO-criticality
tasks but dropped both S3 and S4 replicas, whereas ATMP-CA successfully allocated all
HI-criticality services, including the replicated tasks, and dropped all LO-criticality ones.
In addition, ATMP-CA allocated the S3 replica task D with the maximum utility as a
result of the degradation of task C, and both S4 replicas were degraded, which showed
that the modified optimisation process could not find a solution to allocate task F at
maximum utility.
6.3. Discussion
The aim of the experiments was to show the benefit of taking into account knowledge
about criticality arithmetic in the design of a mixed-criticality scheduler. The experiments
showed that the criticality-aware core allocation in ATMP-CA and SAMP-CA provides
a benefit over ATMP and SAMP, respectively, by ensuring that tasks from services using
criticality arithmetic are allocated to separate cores. The modified ILP objective function
of ATMP-CA was found to better use resources in case of resource limitations. Overall,
ATMP-CA allows an even smoother degradation compared with ATMP in the case of
services using criticality arithmetic.
The limitation of the current experiments is that we only examined systems with
two criticality levels. Future work may involve extending the method to multiple levels
of criticality.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we described the concept of criticality arithmetic, also known as SIL
arithmetic, which is a technique used to reduce the required development effort of a service
using task replication. The contribution of this paper is the development of ATMP-CA,
a mid-term scheduler that takes into account information about criticality arithmetic to
provide a graceful degradation of system utility in the case of resource shortages, for
example, those caused by faults. As such, ATMP-CA can optimise the overall system utility
in the case of resource shortages, with special consideration of services implemented via
criticality arithmetic. Although it is common to limit the source of resource shortages in
mixed-criticality systems to overruns of WCET estimates, we were able to consider any
source of resource shortage, including failure of computing elements.
We conducted experiments comparing ATMP-CA with ATMP and the simpler sched-
uler SAMP. The results showed that ATMP-CA is capable of serving systems with criticality
arithmetic better than the others. For example, ATMP-CA was the only scheduler that was
able to retain service S3 with criticality arithmetic in case where 8 out of 10 cores failed.
In the case where 6 out of 10 cores failed, both ATMP-CA and SAMP-CA (an extension
of SAMP with the same core allocation as ATMP-CA) were able to retain service S3 with
criticality arithmetic. The latter case showed that considering criticality arithmetic during
the core allocation is important on its own for criticality arithmetic.
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Appendix A. Glossary of Main Elements Used in System Model
τ.c . . . worst-case execution time (WCET) of task τ; also written as c(τ): τ.c ≥ τ.et
Cap(cr) . . . computing capacity of computing element cr ∈ Cores
Cores . . . set of computing elements
τ.d . . . deadline of task τ
τ.et . . . real execution time of task τ
τ.l, s.l . . . criticality level of task τ respective service s
τ.p, τ.u . . . chosen period and resulting utility of task τ: τ.u = uf (τ.p)
τ.pprim . . . primary period of task τ
τ.ptol . . . tolerance period of task τ
s.T . . . set of tasks implementing service s
τ.utol . . . utility of task τ at period ptol : τ.utol = uf (τ.ptol)
uf (p) . . . utility function (defined by pprim, ptol , utol), calculates utility for a period p
U . . . absolute utility U = u · l
Appendix B. List of Acronyms Used in this Paper
ASIL . . . automotive safety integrity level
ATMP . . . adaptive tolerance-based mixed-criticality protocol
CA . . . criticality arithmetic (also known as SIL arithmetic)
DAL . . . development assurance level
HI, LO . . . high and low criticality (in examples with only 2 criticality levels)
ILP . . . integer linear programming
PFD . . . probability of failure on demand
PFH . . . probability of failure per hour
SAMP . . . standard adaptive mixed-criticality protocol
SIL . . . safety integrity level
TRTCM . . . tolerance-based real-time computing model
WCET . . . worst-case execution time
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